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Chapter 1
Research Question

This paper explores the implementation of international law through trade
agreements in Latin America. Through examining the workings of these trade
agreements, | show how smaller countries benefit from these treaties with larger

countries. | will be focusing on the trade group Mercosur, specifically how
Uruguay and Paraguay relate to the larger member states, Argentina and Brazil.

Mercosur is a trade organization comprised of the nations of the southern cone:
Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay- with the affiliate Chile. This study will
attempt to explain the relationship between small state powers and written rules,
specifically why are small states given powers within trade groups that they do not

possess outside of those groups and what is the relationship between these powers
and the written rules that uphold them? The difference between real world power
and power granted through written rules is what defines the limitations of small
state power. Real world power is power exerted through economic pressure or

military force. Although they might have written equality within a trade group,
the respect for the laws of that group is really what determines the effectiveness of
those abilities. The world is changing through globalization; countries are
becoming more reliant upon their international “credibility and legitimacy” to

demonstrate their power (Niall Ferguson, 2003).
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Mercosur Background:
Mercosur, or Mercosul began in 1991 as a regional trade agreement among

the countries Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay.

It was created by the

presidential signing of the Treaty of Asuncién and modified by the Treaty of Ouro
Preto in 1994. Its original intention was to create a common market with a fluidity
of trade motion of people, goods, and services. Although it has not reached its

goals in terms of trade liberalization, Mercosur has advanced further than any of
its predecessors. In the five years following the creation of Mercosur, trade of
exports among the four member countries increased from 8 percent to 21 percent.
Its predecessor, the Latin American Free Trade Asssociation (LAFTA) was created
in the 1960s with a goal of creating a liberalized trade union in 12 years.
Unfortunately, LAFTA existed in a time of high protectionism in Latin America,
effectively halting progression in trade relations in the region (Roett 1999).
Knowing the history of failed trade unions in the region makes the imperfections
of Mercosur seem less grave, and makes its strong points more impressive, but it
also shows a pattern of failure due to protectionism, something with which
Mercosur is now struggling.

The unity and fluidity of Mercosur is also threatened by a preference for
creating alliances with more powerful outside entities. Recently Brazil has begun
to look more seriously at creating trade agreements outside the Mercosur unionhaving talks with the European Union, which concerns its trading partners. How
could a small country such as Uruguay prevent such an action or merit the same

Goodwin 3

consideration in Brazil's decision making process as an entity as large as the

European Union? Hopefully by looking at the actions taken in the past by the
members of Mercosur and other trade organizations, the answer will become
clearer. These points will also be clarified by looking at specific cases in which the
countries of Paraguay and Uruguay have clashed with the larger two Mercosur
countries and how they have fared in the various disputes. For instance, Uruguay
and Argentina still have not come to an agreement over a pulp mill on the river
separating the two countries after six years of disagreement. The nations maintain
relations (and honor some Mercosur agreements), but exist with an Argentine

bridge blockade on some routes entering the country from Uruguay.

In this case,

neither the more powerful nor the less powerful country effectively triumphed;
they are both locked in a perpetual stalemate. When Venezuela wanted to enter
Mercosur as a partner, and Paraguay was not willing to allow it, the Paraguayan
senate simply dropped the bill completely and did not vote, effectively stalling the
vote indefinitely. In this case, it seems that written international agreements, such
as the Mercosur constitution can be the small country’s best ally, but this option is

not always available. These are two cases in which written agreement has aided
smaller countries in achieving their goals, whether it is Paraguay’s ability to halt a
vote, or Uruguay’s ability to stand up for itself against a larger nation. Of course,
larger and more powerful countries always have the ability to override written
agreement by sheer force. It is up to the small country to choose its battles wisely,
and, more importantly, choose carefully how it will react in a confrontation.
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Attempting to predict a country’s actions and how those actions will be

received can be important in determining how a trade group will work through the
relationships of the group members.

Group dynamics as a whole makes up a large

part of functionality and success of the group; if the players cannot interact ina
way that promotes integration and cooperation, the group cannot survive and

attempts to make it work could lead to new and deeper tensions.

By examining

past relations among the states in the group and predicting how members of a
group will work together, the more obvious and common problems can be
avoided. Also by analyzing the structure of past groups, where they succeeded and
where they failed, the creation of securely functional systems becomes easier and
more likely to succeed.

For instance, in the European Union, small states are

guaranteed specific protections from the beginning of their membership.

These

guaranteed protections have been continuously and faithfully granted, which is the
reason small countries in the EU have been more successful than those in newer or

less structured unions such as Mercosur. There are both advantages and
disadvantages for small states and large ones entering into a new trade group, and
to make sure that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages, these countries
must be assured that their individual interests can still be addressed while
remaining in line with the object and purpose of the group as a whole.

It is true that small states gain many benefits from trade groups and
agreements with larger countries, including powers of persuasion that would not

exist in an anarchic system. Whether or not these powers are “true” powers, that is
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that they are given without taking away a small state’s sovereignty and that they
when they are used properly and legally, the decisions made with them will be
followed by larger states even if it goes against the larger state’s interests. If the
smaller state’s power is only useful when a larger state also agrees with its usage, it
is not a true power.

In the EU, smaller states are given much the same

consideration as larger ones; is the same true of Mercosur, a much younger and
much less developed system? Small states in Mercosur will not have the same
abilities as those in the EU until the rules of Mercosur are as respected as those of
the EU, and it is debatable whether Mercosur is headed in the right direction for

that to happen.

Government officials disagree on this exact fact; they are unsure if

Mercosur will develop in a way beneficial to the member nations, continue to be
full of holes, or if it will even survive. Most agree, however that Mercosur should

set more clear goals and stick to them.
Defining the relationship between what is written and what is actually in force
is the key to determining how much power a small state has within a trade union.
Defining this relationship on a case by case basis is difficult, but it is impossible to
make it generally applicable to all small states. Inter-state interaction is extremely
complex, in part because the system of international law is so complex and varies

so greatly from case to case. How does one determine the exact boundaries of the
dynamic in a given situation? Where do written rules give way to real world
bargaining power?
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International Law

Unlike domestic law, where there is an effective government to ensure its
laws are being followed, international law can only be created through interstate
cooperation.

It exists as an anarchic system because there is no overarching power

to enforce the rules laid out by different groups and associations attempting to
create world order. Even if a policing arm of this sort were to exist, it would
destroy the idea of state sovereignty.

Countries involved in trade groups range in

size and power, but all rely on favorable international opinion gained from support
from like countries to give them legitimacy (Niall Ferguson, 2003).

Small states

within these groups are usually given guarantees to ensure their cooperation, but
the larger countries only are required to follow through because they like to
maintain the benefits of cooperation.

The tangible powers that small states have

are related to the other countries involved in the group. In the United Nations,
most countries have exactly the same capabilities on paper, but the opinion of a
powerful nation is likely to mean more when it comes time to vote on matters
concerning several nations (Mark W. Janis and John E. Noyes 1-9, 2006).

Structure of Trade Unions - European Union and Mercosur
Because the European Union is the most developed multinational trade
group, examining some of its more successful aspects could be helpful in
determining what will and will not work for Mercosur.

However, the European

Union functions in a manner very different from that of Mercosur; the EU has a
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very well organized arm for dispute settlement while Mercosur relies primarily on
bilateral negations between the disputing countries. The EU has one court of
justice that makes rules on issues that affect the union, its policies, and individual
actors bringing claims against states. This court ensures that all nations within the

union receive the same treatment when dealing with each other and that
individual national courts do not make binding decisions that go against EU
policies. Since each country has one judge on the court it provides the most
unbiased decisions possible, giving small countries equal opportunity to solve
disputes in their favor. The EU also has a three part governmental system made
up of the Council of the European Union, comprised of representatives from each
member state; The European Parliament, voted on by the population; and the
European Commission, which has no obligation to the member government. Each

has a distinct function in making decisions for the EU as a whole and enforcing its
policies (European Union).
When Mercosur began, if bilateral negotiations failed, the issue was
reviewed by the Common Market Group which had to make decisions within sixty

days; if no decision was made, it continued to the Council of the Common Market,
a council made up of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs from each of the four
countries (Treaty of Asuncién).

Before 1994 the member states were to implement

a permanent system. In 1993, the states agreed upon the Protocol of Brasilia which
created ad hoc tribunals and made the CMC and the CMG

resolutions more

prominent, but even after the creation of the tribunals the states relied on bilateral
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negotiations and the decisions of the Council of the Common Market and the
Common Market Group. The new treaty addition also made it possible for
individuals to bring claims, but not directly. Individuals would have to take up
disputes with the CMG first and its experts would review the situation and set up a
tribunal. In 1995 the Mercosur members signed the Protocol of Ouro Preto, giving
Mercosur a new outlet for dispute settlement, the Mercosur Trade Commission.

The MTC brought a new dynamic into the resolution scene by taking cases both
between states and states and individuals. In 2004 the Protocol of Olivos added an
appeal court called the Permanent Review Court, which has final word over the ad

hoc tribunals (Gabriella Giovanna Lucarelli de Salvio and Jeanine Gama Sa Cabra).
Small State Options - The European Union and Mercosur
The structure of Mercosur now, after these several additions, looks much

more like that of the EU, organized with defined roles for the arms of dispute
resolution and a sophisticated system for appellation. What works for the EU,
however, does not necessarily work for the Mercosur states; although on paper the
Mercosur system looks workable, in practice, disputes rarely get solved as simply
as the process could allow. In the case of Brazil and Argentina, trade disputes are
more likely to end in economic sanctions than in peaceful resolution.
Mercosur has a much more exhaustible list of nations for possible future
members than the EU, but this might actually serve the smaller countries within

Mercosur better than being a part ofa group such as the EU for as more nations
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join the EU; smaller states within it gain more powers as a whole, but do not
necessarily gain more individual powers. With EU membership come a number of
benefits, not the least of which is a spot on the rotating EU council presidency.
Smaller nations in the EU have traditionally used this position to promote their
own agendas, but with the addition of more and more members, the chance of
nations promoting interests that conflict with the previous or following
administration is more likely. Also, with the addition of many new members,
because small and large states alike are given equal time in the presidency, even
small ones, the time between each country’s presidencies is lengthened with every
acceptance (Baldur Thorhallson and Anders Wivel, 2006).

Noting the difference

in makeup is important in determining the actual power of Mercosur’s small
nations. Because they are the only two, it is doubtful that an alliance would yield
much result; however, it also means that they have less competition for attention
and resources.

Defining the Small State
To discuss the actions on and by small states, the term small state must be
defined. A small state can be small or weak in one area and innovative and
powerful in another as in the case of the Benelux countries; they are small in size
and population but have played an integral part in forming the policies and the
structure of the EU. Likewise, measuring the population or military investment of
a country might not truly measure the level of influence it has on its neighbors,
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whether it be through economic power, historic prestige, or other factors.
Focusing on only one factor or only physical factors limits the understanding of
the country and how it behaves in the global sphere. Grouping countries together
merely using population, for example, does not assure a grouping of like countries
nor does it define clearly a cutoff point for deciding which countries fall into this

category (Baldur Thorhallson and Anders Wivel, 2006).

Although the EU

generally has high approval, the populations of smaller countries especially
maintain a constant approval of their country’s membership due to the many
benefits they receive. The people of larger countries already would receive many

of these benefits, and sometimes the people of those countries focus more on what
the country gives up for the group than what it gains (European Commission,
2007).

For the purposes of this paper, the small state will be defined by both

economic power and population. In Mercosur, the dividing line is clearer than in
the European Union; because it has so many like members, it is difficult to

definitively say that one is more powerful than another.

Mercosur is less

complicated in that there are far fewer members and there is a clear dividing line
between the two smaller countries, Paraguay and Uruguay, and the two larger
ones, Brazil and Argentina, when grouping the nations for analysis.
In an organization such as Mercosur, it is important to maintain some

semblance of equality among the nations, and although many trade groups write
equality into their founding documents, it does not extend off the page. Mercosur
has had similar problems. Perfect equality among the nations is not written into its
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doctrine, nor is it part of its parliamentary structure, but the smaller nations of
Paraguay and Uruguay do have a voice in parliament.

How well that voice is heard

in the “real world” outside of parliament is another matter. In 2000, Brazil
supplied 70 percent of Mercosur’s gross domestic product, a “real world” attribute

that gave (and still gives) it real power (Roett, 1999). Argentina made up about
27%, leaving Uruguay with 2% and Paraguay 1% (Federal, 2000).

With such an

overwhelming display of economic power coming from Brazil and Argentina, it is

difficult for Paraguay and Uruguay to disagree with the larger powers. When they
do disagree, they must find their power to object within the Mercosur constitution
and not through overt strength. One of these powers found in the legal structure
of the group by the smaller nations is to prevent new members from fully entering
Mercosur.

Hypotheses
In dealing with each other in disputes, states have two possible broad
patterns of behavior. If there is a small threat, such as the Uruguayan threat to
Argentina, a state might use great force just to prove it can “win,” or it might use
little force because it has little to lose. In that case, Argentina uses very little force,

but also gains very little. When dealing with Brazil, however, Argentina uses great
force through many tactics to succeed; it has much to lose if Brazil either were to

flood its markets with cheaper goods or stop trade all together. Argentina focuses
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much more energy and resources in striking an acceptable balance with Brazil
than it does in dealing with the Uruguayans. It seems that, especially in the
modern world, most states generally follow the same pattern as Argentina, using

more aggression against more powerful adversaries and moderate aggression
against less powerful ones. This is a change from earlier ages when territorial
conquest was most important; in today’s world, international integrity (or
developing international trust and recognition) is vital to survival.
Research Design - Cases

The three cases that follow each demonstrate a different type of
relationship possible within a trade union. Although every case of interaction
between countries is different and can only be fully explained with specific
knowledge of the interaction, these cases exemplify three important dynamics that
exist in all trade groups.
Argentina vs. Uruguay
This case between Argentina and Uruguay exemplifies the relationship
between a large state and a small state within the realm of a trade union.

Outside

the trade union, the state with more bargaining power would force a quick end to
the dispute, but within the trade group they are more equal, even if it is not a
perfect equality. In 2005, Uruguay accepted an investment from European backers
to build a pulp mill on the Rio Uruguai, the river that creates the border between

Argentina and Uruguay. The investment brought not only outside interest to the
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small country, but also many jobs to a region that had very little personal
opportunity.

Also, it employs an existing Uruguayan industry- the cultivation of

eucalyptus trees. Much to the dismay of the Uruguayans, before construction even

began, citizens of the Argentine city directly facing the site of the plant began
protesting and blockaded the bridge connecting the cities.

This blockade is still in

place five years later. The protestors and later the Argentine government said that
the mill was (and is) polluting the river and damaging eco-industry, a claim that
the Uruguayans deny. For the Uruguayans, the benefits of keeping the mill open

outweigh the costs of avoiding the blockaded bridge (Dow Jones).

After attempts

at talks between the two nations, this case was referred to the International Court

of Justice following the original agreement made by Argentina and Uruguay in 1975
that would manage all matters concerning the border river (UNtreaty). This is a
strange situation, because Uruguay does not agree that it broke the 1975
agreement, yet Argentina went around (and against) Mercosur to attempt to solve
the problem. Argentina treated the incident as if it were outside the range of
Mercosur, when the blockade affects all of the member nations.

Venezuela and Paraguay

This case, a dispute between Paraguay and Venezuela (which is not a
member of Mercosur) shows how a trade union can give a small state power that it
would not otherwise have. Because Venezuela is outside the umbrella of
Mercosur, it does not wield the same power it would if the two countries were
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both outside the group.

For the past few years, Venezuela has vied for Mercosur

membership, but has yet to receive it. The country, although it has much to offer
economically, has faced opposition from the Mercosur members because of its
fiery leader, Hugo Chavez. The two countries that most oppose Venezuela’s
entrance are Paraguay and Brazil. Brazil’s Senate has mixed feelings on the
subject: some welcome the economic opportunities Venezuela would bring to the

group while others fear Chavez’ commitment to working for the group
(Mercopress, December 2008). When the proposal went to the Paraguayan
Congress, it was withdrawn. The Paraguayans did not want to approve it, because
of their own misgivings and those of Brazil. Withdrawing the bill was legal under
Mercosur rules, and it prevented Paraguay from rejecting the bill and disrupting
relations with Venezuela.

In retracting Venezuela's proposal Paraguay was able to bring about exactly
the change it wanted in a legal way. Since it is neither a large country nor an
economic power, Paraguay must stay within the boundaries of Mercosur for two
reasons. Firstly, there are no other real options to put the small country's opinions
into actions; it has nothing else to use as “real world” leverage.

Secondly, if

Paraguay were to be dismissed from the group, it would suffer much more than
the group as a whole.

If Argentina or Brazil were to break the rules, the other

countries could not expel them because they would be losing a major trading
partner and a primary force in giving Mercosur economic legitimacy on a global
scale.

Goodwin 15

Trade Spats - The Constant Battle between Argentina and Brazil

The third case serves as a point of contrast to the other two. This dispute
between Argentina and Brazil shows how two large countries interact,
demonstrating the differences in this dynamic and that of large and small
countries. One of the biggest problems the countries of Mercosur face in creating
a fluid trade group is that the protocol for dispute settlement is not respected
(Mercopress, December 2007). Argentina and Brazil have shown many times that
their preferred method for dispute resolution is not through Mercosur tribunals,
but rather through direct negotiation, a method which has not been successful.

This tension between the two powerhouses has existed since Mercosur began.
Brazil continually pressed for liberalization of the markets, while Argentina
practiced protectionist strategies. One example is a conflict over the way auto
trade should be conducted between the two countries under Mercosur. The
Argentine auto industry does not receive government subsidies as its Brazilian
counterpart does, which gives the Brazilian firms a distinct advantage when it
comes to competing for buyers (Shane Romig, 1998).

Testing Hypotheses

These three cases are primary examples of three possible motives for state
actions.

In the first case Argentina and Uruguay are locked in a stalemate over a

Goodwin 16

relatively small issue where both sides are losing from the lack of commerce across
the major roadway; Uruguay’s pulp mill continues to operate, yet Argentina insists
on maintaining the blockade even though it gains nothing tangible from it. While
neither side is necessarily “winning” the argument, for Uruguay the cost of closing
the plant would be far greater than what it currently loses due to the blocked
bridge. Argentina does not have much to lose in this situation; the action it

protests is already occurring and has been occurring, so nothing more is likely to
worsen the situation. Therefore, because it has nothing to lose and Uruguay is a
relatively small state, Argentina can use whatever powers in reach to try and
neutralize the situation without worrying about escalating tensions.

The second case shows the small country as a clear, if only temporary, winner.
Paraguay makes up only 1% of the total economic power of Mercosur, yet it
managed to prevent Venezuela, a country with many assets, from joining the
group. This ability is one of the few written into the Mercosur treaty that seems to
have actually worked in a tangible way for a small country, and it was successful
for two reasons.

First, it was not a direct attack on another, more powerful

member nation, but rather an evasion of something unpleasant, and secondly the
decision had some backing in the Brazilian legislature. These two combined left
little room for argument from dissenters. This delay is only a temporary solution,
however; Venezuela will continue to apply for membership, and this type of tactic

will not likely be successful again.
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When Argentina and Brazil argue, neither Paraguay nor Uruguay has any
ability to stop it. These two countries have continually broken or “bent” the rules
of Mercosur to fit into their individual agendas while ignoring the purpose of
regional integration. These two are the only ones that are allowed to do this

because they bring something to the table that the other countries cannot afford
to lose; their voices matter more because they stand to lose less than others if
Mercosur disbands or if they were to leave. Neither one can be dismissed because

the whole structure would collapse without the two powers. When two large
countries have disputes, it often leads to greater aggression than when a large
country and a small country argue because the countries not only have more to
lose, but also are going against a greater threat requiring bolder tactics.

Chapter 2 - Argentina and Uruguay
This chapter focuses on the dispute between Argentina and Uruguay over
the building of a pulp mill in Fray Bentos, Uruguay. The mill was built on the river
that divides the two countries and resulted in a citizen-led Argentine blockade of a

bridge over that river. Through studying this case, the dynamic between a large
country and a small country in Mercosur becomes clearer. Defining relationship
between written rules and “real world” power is very complicated in this situation
because the Mercosur protocol for resolving this type of dispute was bypassed and
instead was directed to the International Court of Justice. By attempting to resolve
the issue “out of house” the Argentines weakened the effects Mercosur could have
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had on the outcome of the case, but it did not eliminate them. Argentina still
must consider the fact that treating Uruguay as an inferior state could damage the
Mercosur group dynamic as a whole, even if the case is solved outside of Mercosur.
Although taking the case to the ICJ was legal, by ignoring Mercosur as a viable
outlet for dispute resolution the Argentine government undermines Mercosur’s
legitimacy.
The Situation in Mercosur

When Mercosur began 18 years ago, its developers surely hoped the
member countries to be at least on some level of agreement on how day to day
things would operate. Although they may have anticipated structural problems on
some level, they probably imagined that almost two decades later there would be
more cooperation and fluidity than exists today. Mercosur is at a pivotal point in
its development; the primary adjustment period should be over by now, but it still
suffers from the serious design flaws that have yet to be addressed.

If Mercosur

continues down the path it is on, it will only feel the effects of these and other

unresolved disputes more and more. The case of the pulp mill dispute between
Uruguay and Argentina and the resulting blockade shows the type of
uncooperative attitudes that could sabotage Mercosur’s possible future as an
influential leader in world trade; its only real threats to its survival come from the

inside, and most of these problems seem to involve Argentina in some way. This
dispute is just one of the many examples of Argentina’s anti-Mercosur behavior.
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Even though the other countries have not always acted in ways benefiting
Mercosur as a more perfect trade union, Argentina in particular has implemented
protectionist policy. Perhaps this is because as the second largest Mercosur
economy it feels the need to make its wishes known in a very tangible way; Brazil
is likely to get what it wants most of the time due to its sheer size and economic
power, while Uruguay and Paraguay have little leverage. Argentina is caught
between two policy choices; it would suffer from the loss of Mercosur related trade
more than Brazil, but at the same time Brazil is a major competitor for many of the
goods Argentina produces. Although it would lose if Mercosur were weakened, its
goal to protect its own interests often supersedes consideration for the purposes
and laws of Mercosur.

Case Timeline

On March 7'" 2005 the Finnish company Metsa-Botnia decided to begin a
billion dollar project that would create a pulp mill on the River Uruguay, the river
that separates Uruguay and Argentina. The planned production of the mill was
one million tons of eucalyptus pulp each year (as eucalyptus cultivation is a large

industry in Uruguay) (Comtex, 2005). Soon after this announcement, residents of
the Argentine town Gualeguaychu - across the river from the planned site near the
Uruguayan Fray Bentos began a massive protest that resulted in the blockade of
the bridge connecting the two. A year later, protesters still lingered preventing
trucks from crossing, waving banners, and camping out around fires showing their
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animosity towards their former Uruguayan friends. These protesters included
those originally outside the conflict such as Greenpeace representatives. The
Argentines claim that the mill will pollute the river thereby irrevocably damaging

the Argentine tourism and fishing industries, while the Uruguayans argue that the
mill follows and will follow the strictest of environmental codes throughout the
operation of the mill. The mill brought much needed jobs to the area and
represents the single largest foreign investment in Uruguay’s history. Though the
closing of this bridge forfeited much economic profit usually gained through the
transport of people and goods, the bridge crossing Colon and Paysandt currently
remains open, therefore making the Fray Bentos blockade more of a cost for those
seeking to cross the border rather than an impassable obstacle.

In 2005 Uruguay

still refused to entertain talks with Argentina until it dissolved the blockade
(Daniel Schweimler, 2006). However, by March 2006, the protesters at
Gualeguaychu had agreed to lift the blockade for a time, but Uruguay

refused

talks until all the border-crossing roads were unblocked (the bridge between

Colon and Paysandu was temporarily blocked with the announcement of a second
mill by Spanish company Ence) (Associated Press Financial Wire, 2006 ). On
March 27'" 2006, Botnia agreed to postpone construction on their mill in Uruguay
while Nestor Kirchner, then president of Argentina and Tabaré Vasquez, then

president of Uruguay had talks (M2, 2006). The talks and construction halts came
after a temporary removal of the blockade on the Argentine side (Associated Press
Financial Wire, 2006).

In 2009, the World Bank finished its environmental report
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comparing the water quality before and after the mill began production and
concluded that there had been no change and that the mill was not polluting
(LatinNews Regional Report, April 2009). The Argentine government, using a law
older than Mercosur created by a treaty between Argentina and Uruguay in 1975

(Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007), filed a case with the International Court of
Justice in May 2006 claiming that the mill should be shut down quickly as it was
an immediate environmental threat (Agence France Presse, May 2006). This claim
of immediate danger was rejected in July, but the case still remains unresolved as
Argentina continues to push for the mill’s closing (Agence France Presse, July
2006).

In an attempt to aid in negotiation, in December 2006 the King of Spain

sent a representative to facilitate talks between Vasquez and Kirchner after
Argentina’s accusations (Noticias Financieras, 2006).

Since then there has been

much discussion in the ICJ, and a final decision is expected sometime in 2010.

Theory of small state behavior - The EU as an Example
As a more developed and older trade union, the EU serves as a good point

of comparison to Mercosur. For example, small countries in the European Union
today are coming together more than ever before; they are using the powers given
them, such as the presidency and continually pushing for equal treatment.

When

these smaller countries band together, they create a tangled web that makes it very
difficult for a larger country to infringe upon their rights. By banding together
they have more ofa chance for prolonged equal treatment. This may work well in
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the EU, a well established, well respected union; however Mercosur’s laws are

neither established nor respected.

Unlike the EU, Mercosur countries, especially

the larger ones, can do what they wish, even if it is outside the legal structure of
the group, because the framework is not as respected. When the EU first began,
the framework was not so established and it suffered much like Mercosur does

today from the confusion and stagnation that arises from lack of firm organization
(The European Commission, 2006). If Mercosur survives to grow into as strong a
union as the EU, it will have to undergo much of the same changes as did its larger
counterpart.
In Mercosur the two smaller states, Uruguay and Paraguay, make up little of
the union’s tangible economic weight, unlike in the EU, where there is the

possibility for many small states unify. Because there are only two small states, a
small state coalition is not a workable option in Mercosur. The fact that a small
state alliance between the two countries would not mean much to the outside
observer has not stopped the leaders of Paraguay and Uruguay from trying for a
“mini-alliance” within the larger group (BBC Monitoring Latin America, 2005).
Two possible reasons for creating such an alliance would be to vie for more

attention and a stronger voice and /or to make and strengthen the type of ties that
Mercosur was founded to develop. Even if the alliance did not give the nations a
measurable increase in control of the group, it would give them a small measure of
the things they joined Mercosur to get- increased free trade and regional unity. As
Argentina and Brazil are often locked in power struggles, one or the other
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deliberately preventing Mercosur from operating properly, it makes sense for the

two smaller countries to join together, especially since they have little chance of
forcing the two larger countries to cooperate with each other and with themselves.
Unfortunately, this type of alliance is not important enough to deal with situations
such as the Argentine blockade. When speaking of the “power” held by these

states, the different types of influence they have becomes very important. Power
as influence over abstract issues is not the same as day to day cooperation.

In

theory all of the states in Mercosur have all of the same rights, but in practice the
two larger countries obviously influence policy more. This is true even of the
mission statement of Mercosur itself- to create the free flow of people, goods, and
services and to promote regional unity. The fact that Paraguay and Uruguay were
invited to be a part of the group shows a sort of rules-based consideration, but in
practice, as in this case between Uruguay and Argentina, power-based roots can be
seen. If the Mercosur countries were fully in practice of one system or the other,
the situation would not be stuck the way it is; either the set rules would have been

followed and the situation would have moved forward, or Argentina would have
simply taken what it wanted.

If this had happened in the EU, a small state alliance

could have helped the situation move more quickly because the small state
(Uruguay in this case) would have had multiple backers.
Argentina has not used very aggressive policies when it comes to dealing
with its neighbors. This shows that although some small state powers do not work
without a larger backer, it seems that Paraguay’s abilities in this situation did
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work. Brazil is not directly involved, making Uruguay appear as an independent
actor, however, the benefits of the Mercosur system as a whole could be the
incentive Argentina has for not attacking Uruguay with more force. By pushing

Uruguay further and breaking the current gridlock, the Argentine government
could disturb the delicate balance under which Mercosur currently exists. For this
reason, the issue has been dealt with The nature of the mill issue does not make it
necessary to address it outside Mercosur, but the way it has been addressed is

outside the framework of Mercosur. The two countries are supposed to work
together to find a solution, even using Mercosur tribunals, but instead they find

themselves in a longstanding gridlock and with a case pending in international
courts.

Whether or not Uruguay is exerting power in its own capacity has much to
do with how much Argentina has invested in winning this case. If the Argentine
government is only mildly concerned with actually shutting down the mill and
more concerned with events outside the sphere of this conflict that could be

affected by the outcome of the conflict, then the ICJ response makes sense. One
such concern could be Argentina’s public image; if its citizens had mounted this
major blockade/protest and the government had done nothing, it would have
either been perceived as incompetent or uncaring. By not stopping the blockade,
however, the Argentine government is (albeit passively) giving its support to the
movement (International Court of Justice, 2006). On the other hand, trade in the

southern cone is an important part of Argentina’s economy, and losing the flow of
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goods and people by damaging relations with Uruguay might hurt more than the
potential negative effects on the Rio Uruguay caused by the mill. Also, as one of
Uruguay’s best trading partners, Argentina probably would benefit from its
increased capital. In this case, Mercosur as a union would be giving Uruguay
special powers it otherwise would not have.

If the closing of the mill is Argentina’s main concern, however, and
Uruguay’s present ability to keep its mill running is solely based on its power, then
Mercosur is creating a situation in which Uruguay has legitimate leverage over a

larger country. To understand just how much Argentina is willing to give up to
stop the mill from producing, we must first look at how much Argentina relies on
the economic benefits given it by Mercosur. 25.8% of its trade was made within
Mercosur from 2000-2005, the period just before the dispute began (European
Commission, 2007). Having just over a quarter of its entire trade invested in the

delicate balance of Mercosur, it makes sense that Argentina would have tried to
keep the effects of the protest reflected upon it to a minimum. Perhaps this is the
reason for the somewhat strange first response on the part of the Argentine
government.

Disrupting a quarter of its trade might have been a very serious

concern when the mill first opened, but since the beginning of 2009, intra-regional
trade in Mercosur has dropped. According to one source, in the first few months
of 2009 Brazilian exports to Argentina plunged 41%, Argentina to Brazil dropped
19%, Argentina to Uruguay down 18%, Brazil to Uruguay less 30%, Uruguay to
Argentina declined 36%, and Uruguay to Brazil fell 9% (Uruguay no aplicd).
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However, Argentina cannot simply give up now that it has invested so much in the

fight, nor can it risk losing its trading partners in the midst ofa global recession.
Once the blockade had begun, the government had to show some competent
reaction; showing no concern and doing nothing would have seemed uncaring and
unpatriotic, while a more aggressive tactic might have seriously damaged relations
with Uruguay causing a rippling effect of trouble.
How much does Uruguay have to lose?
Now that the mill is up and running, it would be extremely difficult for
Uruguay to close it. Even though it loses some $400 million dollars in trade

annually due to the blockade, it has far more to lose by giving in to Argentina’s
wishes and closing the plant altogether (U.S. Water News). As the World Bank
reports it, the Fray Bentos mill adds 2% to Uruguay's GDP and is equal to 8% of all
Uruguayan exports (Dow Jones). The plant also provides around 15,000 jobs in an
area with little stable employment opportunities (Claudia Orellana, 2005). In
addition to all of these benefits, Uruguay could be seriously penalized if it were to
close the mill; Uruguay is responsible for the investments made by several
European countries and aid from the World Bank (Fernando Cabrera Diaz, 2009).
In short, for Uruguay, the benefits of an operational mill far outweigh the financial

burden caused by the bridge blockade at Gualeguaychu.

For Uruguay to back

down, Argentina would have to apply much more pressure, something it is
unlikely to do given that the damages it claims the mill causes are non-material,
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somewhat indefinable, and largely unproven.

In oral discussion in the ICJ,

Uruguay denied that its mill produced the chemical pollutions, Lindane and
nonylphenols, found by Argentine water tests, instead blaming the toxins on the
Argentine agricultural industry (Fernando Cabrera Diaz, 2009). As Argentina’s
claims are hard to define and even harder to prove, it does not want to upset the
delicate Mercosur dynamic, and Uruguay is determined to stand its ground, it is
unlikely that Argentina will apply enough force to cause an outright conflict.
As a populist, President Christina Kirchner of Argentina relies heavily on
popular support. She fits the definition of populism as stated by two leading
historians, Michael Conniff and Alan Knight. Although scholars differ greatly on
the definition of populism and which leaders do and do not fit into that category,
Kirchner fits the basic criteria upon which most scholars agree. She relies more on
personal appeal than ideology, leads by charisma, mobilizes the poor, and shapes
and maintains the Argentine identity. Since Christina Kirchner relies so heavily on

public approval, the Argentine public opinion on this point is crucial to
understanding the government’s actions (Michael Conniff and Alan Knight). A

poll taken in 2009 showed that 83% of the residents of Gualeguaychu supported
the blockade, but that 60% of all Argentines support lifting the blockade
(Mercopress, November 2009). Given that the Argentine public is split on the
topic more so now than they were when it first began shows that they are growing
weary of the trouble the blockade causes. Around 75,000 people live in
Gualeguaychu according to the 2008 estimation of the Argentine National
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Institute of Statistics (INDEC), the government department in charge of the
census. This is about 6.5% of the total population of the province Entre Rios, a
region that depends greatly on the fishing industry not only on the Rio Uruguai,
but also the Rio Parana and their tributaries.

When the final IC) decision is given, Argentina’s crowd-pleasing populist
leader will have to choose when or if the blockade will be lifted. It is still unclear
how concerned the Argentine government actually is over closing the mill. The
government is more concerned with winning the argument and “saving face” than
the actual adverse effects of the mill. Argentina’s rule-based approach (appealing
to the ICJ) was a deliberate move toward a blame-deflection strategy.

How much power does Uruguay have?

Why is it now so popular to have small states in a semblance of power or in
real power within trade organizations?

Generally the world is moving away from

anarchy, towards a global rules-based system.

This is popular now, but is it all just

the age-old power-based system dressed in sheep’s clothing? If small countries are
only getting what they want because there is a larger power backing them, does

the small state really have power of its own or simply the illusion of it? From this
case and the ones that follow, it seems that at least in Latin America’s Mercosur
there is the a vague desire to move towards a cooperative, fair regional systemmore like that of the EU, but that has not yet been achieved.

The reason that
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progress has not been made in this case is that relationship between the two
countries is stuck somewhere in between the desire for complete cooperation and
complete domination.

Conclusion

When dealing with Uruguay, Argentina did not solve the problem by using
the brute force it possesses as a larger nation, but acted more passively in
blockading the bridge and then making a claim to the International Court of
Justice. It is possible that Argentina acted this way because it did not consider
Uruguay a major threat and feared international rejection more than actual

damage by the Uruguayan mills or that the cost of major actions is too great.
However, seemingly passive approaches have been Argentina’s approach in other
disputes in modern times between the two nations, even before Mercosur.

In 1975

Argentina and Uruguay signed a treaty, which, among other issues regarding the
Rio de la Plata, legally settled the centuries-old dispute over the island Martin
Garcia, putting it under the jurisdiction of Argentina although it is much closer to
the Uruguayan coast.

In this instance, like the pulp mill dispute, Argentina relied

on its size and power to achieve its goals. In this instance, unlike the recent
dispute, Argentina was able to use its influence to sway the treaty agreements in

key points without very much serious opposition from Uruguay (Gobierno de
Argentina) and (UNtreaty).
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Because international law is so complex, Argentina had options in bringing
this case to court.

By choosing the ICJ over Mercosur courts it attempted to make

the case a non-Mercosur issue, even though the blockade clearly affects Mercosur

affairs- i.e. the facilitation of the movement of goods and people among the
member nations. Again, this shows Argentina’s unwillingness to use Mercosur in
the way it was meant to be used.
Small states have unique powers in trade agreements, and in this case we

have seen that although they do not necessarily put smaller countries on equal
footing with larger ones, they can cause the larger nations to consider and respect
the opinions and interests of the smaller nations. The world is moving more
towards a rules-based system, but it is not quite there yet. There is more
consideration for rules than there was before the creation of the EU (and the UN
to some extent). Total wars like World Wars | and II have not happened again in
Europe mainly as a result of economic integration and the changes in perception
in what is considered acceptable behavior for nations.

Globalization has changed

the way states interact, and just as globalization is not complete, the shift to an
international rules-based system remains incomplete, and will remain incomplete
until all countries have equally coercive incentives to follow the same rules
(allowing that a set of rules has been agreed upon) (Mark W. Janis and John E.
Noyes, 2006).

This case shows us that although Uruguay’s power is not as strong

as it could be if the rules-based system was complete that being a part of Mercosur

does give it an influence that it otherwise would not have. This type of power is
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included in agreements because colonization and imperialism are no longer

accepted (at least in theory, abstractly) as appropriate forms of obtaining valuable
resources. Because it has less to lose than Uruguay, and Uruguay is a relatively
small state, Argentina can use whatever powers in reach to try and neutralize the
situation without worrying too much about escalating tensions, but it would like
international recognition for trying peaceably, using the ICJ and its reputation as a
means to deflect inevitable criticism that would come from whichever decision the

government made. Now that the world is more connected than ever, international
recognition and respect is essential; this concern for a good public image is just
one reason small states are ever gaining more power, but it is an important one.

Chapter 3 - Paraguay and Venezuela
This chapter will examine the ability of small states to affect change within
and outside a trade group. By dropping the bill that would allow Venezuela into
Mercosur, Paraguay effectively used the Mercosur structure to prevent change

both for member countries and for Venezuela, an outsider. Although Paraguay’s
decision not to vote in Venezuela had some support in the Brazilian legislature,
Brazil’s President Lula supported Venezuela’s entry and the bill had already gotten
the approval of Uruguay and Argentina (AQ Online). The fact that the bill had this
support and Paraguay was still able to block it shows that Paraguay can act on its
own efficaciously.
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The use of written rules in this case shows that legally operating within the
Mercosur framework can be an effective tool in promoting national interest.
Without a respect for rules-based international law, Paraguay’s success could
never have been possible, and the fact that the other countries involved respected
the action and its legality shows that there is a will for this type of cooperation to

exist, even if it is often overshadowed by personal interest.
The Situation in Mercosur

Since 2006, Paraguay has been blocking Venezuela’s official entrance into
Mercosur, claiming that inviting Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez into a
position of power in their group is too much ofa risk for it and for the group as a
whole. Even though Paraguay’s last two presidents have been rather close to Hugo
Chavez, especially Fernando Lugo, denial from the Paraguayan senate and pressure
from Brazil have prevented entrance talks from moving forward. As Paraguay has
little economic power to use as leverage, using the Mercosur framework is one of
the few, but important measures it can take. Paraguay’s excuse for not admitting
Venezuela is more than a political statement; it does not want the dynamic of

Mercosur to change in a way damaging to its interests, and while Chavez is leading
Venezuela there is no sure way to determine what changes will come. Actually
taking full advantage of the rules set up within Mercosur is something that the
member nations do not do enough; more often they do nothing or rely on
economic sanctions and other methods to achieve their goals. If the case in the
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previous chapter is any indication of the expected progression of events, reactions
that do not follow the Mercosur guidelines for dispute resolution and are used
within Mercosur do not lead to quick or definitive resolutions.
The Argentina/Uruguay case in the last chapter showed that Mercosur is an

attempt for these Southern Cone countries to move from a strictly power-based
system to a rules-based one.

Unfortunately, as it is in transition, there results a

high level of confusion and blockage. Also, since the Mercosur rules are not as
respected as in other organizations, there is a tendency for countries to follow
them when it is convenient, not following them because they are agreed upon
rules, but rather because in the specific instance they will pay a beneficial role.
Just from examining the last case it would seem Mercosur is stalled permanently or
temporarily, but seeing a small country rely on the rules system entirely shows
that quagmire is not inescapable. The last case showed that being in between
rules and power based systems can result in gridlock, but in this case rules were
followed and progress was made. Why did this case move forward, and the
Uruguay/Argentina case did not? If the parties are willing to work together, why
has more progress not been made in the last case? In the case of Paraguay and
Venezuela, we can see that although regional integration is the essential purpose
of Mercosur, there are other factors that concern the founding nations more than
expansion. There are several possible reasons for countries to stall the process.
The smaller nations would lose much of what little power they have by adding
another country, especially one that has so much to offer for leverage. Brazil
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produces its own oil and adding another oil producer into the freer trade group
could hurt its oil industry and reduce its leverage with Argentina. Petrobras, as one
of Brazil’s most lucrative businesses, would not welcome an influx of Venezuelan

oil into the group. However, President Lula can support Venezuela's entry because
Brazil has many other lucrative industries that might even be helped by the new
member.

Case Timeline

Venezuela has tried to gain acceptance into Mercosur for many years. In
2006, the founding members agreed to allow Venezuela into the group, but it has

yet to be officially invited as it faces opposition from Brazil and Paraguay. The
opposition in the Brazilian Senate argues that “basic liberties are not guaranteed”
and that “Mercosur can’t accept Venezuela, until Chavez is out of office” because

he could prevent the block from moving forward “by insisting on an ideological
agenda”. Those in favor point out that any delay is only losing Mercosur the

money and resources that Venezuela can offer (Mercopress, 2008 Brazilian
Congress). Venezuela proposes as incentive for entry its oil industry, which could
make Mercosur significantly more industrialized and self-sufficient because it
would give it control of 89% of South America's total GDP. While this could be
very important in uniting the region, there is a fear that Chavez will use it to
support his international agenda and drive a wedge between countries. According
to one source, he already is using the possible promotion as a way to speak out
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against the United States, saying that South America's "destiny is Mercosur, and
that's anti-FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas)” (The Associated Press, 2005
Venezuela’s entry).

Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso Amorim supports Venezuela's
attempts to gain entry in to Mercosur, saying it will be beneficial to the region as a
whole through the trade giant. Supporting "economic integration" is the primary
goal of Mercosur, not individual interests. Brazil's motive is to prevent Venezuela
from to looking to other countries for trade such as Iran others in the Middle East.
Also, it could cause Venezuela to act less rashly in its relations with the rest of the
world. Amorim states that it would be more costly to isolate Venezuela than to
include it in Mercosur (BBC Worldwide, 2007 Brazil hopes). Amorim also says

that Venezuela's membership in Mercosur will reinforce democratic stability.
According to him, it will strengthen Mercosur as well, giving it even more
legitimacy and trade options in the region (BBC Worldwide, 2008 Venezuela’s
entry).

Because there is some Brazilian backing for the Venezuelan entry, the fact
that Paraguay was able to use its power could be construed as simply an exercise of
the Brazilian strength rather than Paraguayan, however, in 2007 when the
Chamber of Foreign Relations Committee in Brazil approved Venezuela's

membership in Mercosur, The PSDB (Brazilian Social Democracy Party) and the
DEM (Democrats), two of the four largest parties, did not participate. Also, the
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final vote was 16 yes, the minimum.

Those who voted against it or abstained cited

Hugo Chavez and his off- beat international political agenda as the force behind
their decisions. They disagree with both his methods and his ideology
(Mercopress, 2008 Brazilian congress). This committee is not the only committee
that has to vote on the matter, however, the Constitution and Justice Committee

(CCJ) also must vote before it goes to the Chamber floor and then to the Senate
(BBC Worldwide, 2007).

Despite the Brazilian response, Chavez received a warm welcome from the

Argentine president Christina Fernandez de Kirchner (they met in 2008 to reaffirm
their solidarity) (BBC Worldwide 2008, Argentine, Venezuelan).

After this

response from the Brazilians, Venezuela still needed the approval of the
Paraguayan legislature. The Paraguayan legislature did not look favorably on the
bill, and would not have passed it; the normal entrance requirement is to have the

vote of an absolute majority of the parliament (80 representatives and 45
senators), which it would not have received (El Universal, March 2009).

In August of 2009, Paraguay withdrew the bill for Venezuela’s entrance into
Mercosur. The Paraguayans would rather withdraw the bill than have it rejected

in the senate and ruin its relations with Venezuela. According to foreign minister
Hector Lacognata, the bill could be brought back to the table if there were enough
supporters. However, many Paraguayans feel that a Venezuela under Hugo Chavez
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is not committed enough to democracy and free trade to be allowed into Mercosur
(Mercopress, 2009 Paraguayan government).

Theory of small state behavior
Even if small states have the ability to exert power in trade unions, it is
always necessary for them to choose their battles wisely. By showing a measure of
power in this case, Paraguay asserted that the issue was important enough for it to
put its strength to the test; there is always a chance, for any country, that the
nation they act against could retaliate in a damaging way. Paraguay assessed the
risks in this situation, deciding that keeping the status quo in this situation- both
within and outside of Mercosur was worth the possibility that the other countries
would react negatively. Paraguay could lose its semblance of power if Brazil or
Argentina were to disagree, making this type of proactive effort impractical for
future use. It could also lose another chance at using Urupabol (or something like
it). Urupabol was an agreement made by Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia in 1963
to create another force in South America other than the two giants, Brazil and

Argentina. This group lasted 13 years until the advent of the dictator Alfredo
Stroessner. There was an attempt in 2006 to revive the group by Evo Morales and
Hugo Chavez, but this ultimately failed. As far as Venezuela’s involvement in
Urupabol, after it was agreed not to change the name to Urupavenbol, Venezuela
worked to keep the reinstatement of the group off the table.

Although it is not
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currently in use, if it were to return, Urupabol could be a significant force as
Uruguay and Paraguay attempt to create an extra-Mercosur alliance (BBC
Monitoring, August 2008).
Paraguay went through with the plan to pull the bill, however, because the
possible gains were more important than the possible losses. It could gain the
appearance that it has some influence on big Mercosur decisions (whether this is

true or not), something that would make Paraguay seem much more important to
the outside world. Also, if Venezuela were admitted, Paraguay would be one step

further down the chain of command, diminishing its already minor 1% of the total
Mercosur economy. There is also the safety of the status quo; Mercosur is unstable,
and adding another factor (especially a wild card like Chavez), could create
changes Paraguay is unready to face. Fortunately for Paraguay, Venezuela as a
country with more power and more influence in the outside world could not affect
the dynamic within Mercosur due to the actions of the small country.
Who and what is in power

Before President Fernando Lugo of Paraguay was even inaugurated, he
favored the addition of Venezuela into Mercosur, saying that the expansion of
Mercosur is for the betterment of the region by creating “mutual aid among the
member countries, and for development” (BBC Worldwide, 2008 Paraguay’s
President-elect). Lugo’s predecessor, Nicanor Duarte, tolerated Chavez, although
he was more concerned with unifying Mercosur by taking down protectionist
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barriers like those enacted by Argentina than expanding it. He rejected these
policies, saying that they seriously damage Paraguayan export prospects. Asa
small country, Paraguay has few outlets; it cannot afford to lose even one. Lugo is

much more involved with Chavez than Duarte was- something that Duarte
criticized (Le Monde, 2008).

Asa leftist, Lugo has many plans similar to those of

Chavez, the landless poor being a large part of his supporters; he sees the addition
of Chavez as an exciting opportunity.

When the Venezuela case was first brought

up, Duarte was the president of Paraguay; now that Lugo is in power, Chavez could
have another opportunity to join if he chooses to try again. Because the bill can be
resubmitted, Paraguay’s actions do not mean that Venezuela can never be allowed
into Mercosur; allowing one country, no matter which one it is, to decide

important matters such as these could never work here because it goes against the
basic form of a group.

Conclusion

In this case, Paraguay proved that it was possible to work within the
Mercosur framework to achieve important goals. By working through the legal
system, Paraguay “took care of business” showing that a country with little
leverage can take advantage of a working system. A trade union cannot
successfully exist under two forms of motivation for cooperation.

Existing

between a rules-based and power-based system causes clear paths to resolution to
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become clouded. Unlike in the previous case and in the case examined in the next
chapter where the countries involved are stuck in a gridlock of confusing models
of accepted behavior and conflicting agendas, Paraguay’s case was resolved quickly
and clearly. When the formal rules are used, there is little that the other countries

can say to refute the outcome. They can still resort to demonstrating their “real
world” powers, but it would not have the same moral high ground as actually
moving through the established rules, and it could result in a drastic unwanted
change in dynamic. Argentina could not simply overtake Uruguay by shutting it
off completely; it is generally recognized that that would be bending the rules too

far, but it was not willing to allow Uruguay to continue without a fight. Where is
the line drawn, then? Some things are allowed, even considered acceptable even
though they go against the rules, but others are clearly beyond the bounds of
tolerance. As international opinion develops in structure and importance, the
bounds of acceptable behavior become more defined.
The rising significance of opinion resulting from globalization increases the
relative importance of small states, especially within a trade group such as
Mercosur. As the economies and cultures of countries become more intertwined,
the importance of trust and cooperation rises. The role of trade groups like
Mercosur is to facilitate this cooperation by evening the playing field; Paraguay
would have not had this opportunity had the power of Mercosur had not been a
factor. Because Venezuela was outside of the group, it was as if Paraguay was

backed by the whole group (even if individual actors or countries disagreed).
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Clearly, Mercosur will have a much bigger role when dealing with Mercosur issues,
and if these countries had met in disagreement in an anarchic system or over
something that did not involve Mercosur, it would have been a very different

outcome. Since the Mercosur members are so interrelated, through economies
and cultures now more than ever before, to shut off even the least of the group

would be to break the faith in the group, one of the few elements keeping
Mercosur alive.

Chapter 4 - Brazil and Argentina
The last two cases discussed in this paper describe relations involving small
nations, but without knowing how larger nations interact with each other it would
be impossible to know whether the nuances of those small state interactions are
unique. Exploring a similar dispute between two large nations brings to light the
differences and similarities of the dynamics, making it easier to discover the true

motives and understand the effects of specific actions.
The situation in Mercosur

Mercosur as a whole has had some major problems in living up to the goals
set for it in the Mercosur charter. Free trade has suffered as a result of
protectionist strategies that go against the very purpose of the group. While these
strategies might serve well for the present, they show that the health of the group
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is not a primary concern for governments when making decisions. By looking at

the past two cases, we have seen that the group is not ready for total integration or
expansion; this sense of non cooperation does not only exist in relations between a
small country and a large one, but also exists in the daily interactions between the
two large countries, Argentina and Brazil. As Brazil’s buying power grows, its
interest in the union diminishes and Argentina’s interest increases, as the
possibility of Brazil leaving the group (actually or only functionally) also grows.
Argentina should want to increase the importance of the group, but by enacting
protectionist policies they only protect themselves in the short run and damage
the trade group now and in the future. This chapter will focus on this fact; the
countries in this group do not act that much differently when dealing with a much
smaller country as they do when they come into contact with countries of more
comparable size. As Mercosur is at such a decisive moment in its developmentessentially whether it will survive or not- this case is very important in studying
the current Mercosur dynamic and its possible future. If the two biggest economic
powers have a falling out, then the group would no longer be functional. The lack
of respect for the dispute resolution system as demonstrated by the
Argentine/Brazilian trade wars points out the key flaw in the Mercosur of today.
How much does Brazil care?

In this dynamic, Brazil is in a much better position than Argentina, because
it has much less at stake; should Mercosur fail or fracture, Brazil would lose the
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least of all the member nations.

In recent years Brazil has found outlets for its

many exports in the EU and elsewhere, even though some of President Lula’s

rhetoric supposedly gave preference to regional trading partners. The entire trade
within the group made up only 15% of the total trade of the member countries

from 2002-2005 (Lula was inaugurated in 2003). 15% is not a high enough number
to cause Brazil or Argentina to continuously put the importance of Mercosur over
the importance of immediate gain, even though Argentina has much more of its
vital resources tied up in the group than does Brazil. This relatively small
percentage of regional trade could exist even without Mercosur.

During the 2002-

2005 period, nearly 26% of Argentina’s trade was with Mercosur members, while

Brazil’s Mercosur trade only amounted to a little over 9% of its total trade.
How much power does Argentina have?

Argentina has not been as successful as Brazil at opening its markets to the
rest of the world; according to the European Commission, it has made “insufficient

progress in structural reforms...in the fiscal, banking, and utilities sectors.” As a
result, Argentina relies more on Mercosur trade. By 2005 Argentina was importing
5.5 billion Euros more of Brazilian goods than it was only three years before, and
exporting less to Brazil and the other Mercosur nations. By doing this, Argentina
has created a large trade deficit with Brazil (€3.75bn); it produces less and less of
some of its primary exports (energy, cars, and processed agricultural goods) that

used to go to Brazil. This situation has caused the Argentine government to
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implement more protectionist strategies, the root of the trade wars between the

two Mercosur leaders. (The European Commission, 2007).

Continuing Trade Spats - Timeline
Although Mercosur has had almost 20 years to develop, it still carried the same
flaws with which it began. A major flaw is the lack of dispute settling protocol,
and the countries involved have had much trouble coming to specific agreements
(Mercosur Signs 2007). Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo says, “Perhaps it is
time to ask seriously and radically why Mercosur has been unable to come up with
an alternative capable of assuring the high levels of compromise and indispensable
conviction for the loyal fulfillment of all its accords.” Uruguay’s former economy
minister, Danilo Astori, also criticized Mercosur, saying “Why did we create
Mercosur? “To have a broad market [...] and to increase trade and investment

opportunities. However, Mercosur is closed; it is not open to the world.” He went
on to say that after 14 years of talks with the EU, Mercosur as a whole has been
unable to reach any tangible agreements, and that obstructions such as import
licenses (demanded by Argentina), sanitary restrictions, and tough bureaucratic

systems only add to the delay in progression (Region 2009).

One example of these spats is the way Brazil and Argentina argue over the
liberalization of the auto industry within Mercosur. Brazil presses for complete
liberalization while Argentina takes a more protectionist stance, fearing it would
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be unable to compete in the enormous Brazilian market. Also, Brazilian auto firms
receive government subsidies whereas the Argentine firms do not, which gives the

Brazilian firms a distinct advantage when it comes to competing for buyers Many
Argentine companies called for a law that would require companies to maintain
twin factories in Argentina and Brazil, so they could sell cars in one country or the
other while avoiding import taxes. Brazil is also pushing for a better component
trading strategy, while Argentina still keeps a more protectionist policy. (Shane

Romig and Barney Whiteoak, 1998). Another advantage Brazil has is that its
exports are more marketable in that they are more appealing to buyers than
Argentine products and also that Brazil has more of a presence in the international
markets than Argentina. "Since Europe and the U.S. are also our significant trading
partners, the problems with Argentina don't always merit great attention," said
Michel Alaby, vice president of the Mercosur Integration Association of Brazilian
Companies. "But in Argentina, where trade with Brazil is so important, this is a
very big deal" (Simon Romero, 1999). It is difficult to make Mercosur function
when talks between the leading nations in specific cases of trade liberalization
rarely make it past the conference table.

In 1999, after this incident and several others, Brazil stopped talks with
Argentina. The impetus was Argentina's announcement that it would investigate
imports for unfair trading practices and impose new restrictions. "This type of
protection by Argentina is not legally foreseen within Mercosur, which was created
under the principles of free trade," Jose Alfredo Graca Lima, an undersecretary in
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Brazil's Foreign Ministry, said to reporters in the capital, Brasilia. The tension

between the two powerhouses has existed since Mercosur began, and is largely
responsible for the slow progression of the group. Brazil has the ability to stop
talks with Argentina because it has other trade options as Michel Alaby explained
(Simon Romero, 1999).

The future of Mercosur is in jeopardy due to this protectionism.

The fact that

they create these “trade wars” in spite of their supposed commitment to a trade
union shows that the countries are not as in sync as they need to be to make the
union work. By coordinating their macroeconomic policies they could prevent this
type of dispute, but there is much work to be done on this front. Because they are
both such large countries with large economies, there first has to be an equal will
on each side to work together, something that at this moment does not exist
(Marrio E. Carranza, 2003). Resolving disputes between two large countries is
more difficult than when dealing with smaller countries because each large

country has so many interests and a great unwillingness to cede anything to the
other side.

In 2006, Argentina and Brazil found themselves in yet another trade conflict,
this time over Brazilian manufactured appliances. Argentina placed new barriers
on the appliances which led Brazil to consider bypassing the principles of
Mercosur by reacting in like kind and implementing tariffs on Argentine wine,
wheat, and rice. Many fear that this type of power play is exactly the type of action
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that creates rifts in Mercosur that could lead to its collapse. This type of
reoccurring spat between Brazil and Argentina could make a trade deal with the
United States more and more attractive to Paraguay and Uruguay. The
Mechanism of Competitive Adaptation agreement Brazil and Argentina made in
February 2006 allows for private sector negotiation resulting in selective trade
barrier implementation.

In other words, it allows for negative preferential

treatment in a supposedly equalized, integrated trade region. This agreement,
while it might prevent official quarrels between the two governments, it is one that
goes against the very nature and purpose of Mercosur, and sets a bad precedent for

future problem solving (Alan Clendenning, 2006).
In 2009, the disputes increased as the global economic crisis progressed, and
Argentina becomes even more protectionist than usual. Earlier in the year, Brazil
had to retract some import licenses while Argentina imposed new import license
requirements on Brazilian imports and made new reference values for some 800
products. Brazilian firms have reacted very negatively and some such as the Sao
Paulo Industry Confederation (Fiesp) have called for similar impediments to be

placed on Argentina from the Brazilian side. Even affiliates of Mercosur have
begun to go down the protectionist route; Ecuador recently placed barriers on
"non-essential" imports, a violation of the Andean Free Trade Agreement (Latin
News, 2009 fresh trade spats).
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These disputes should be resolved through discussion and vote rather than
economic revenge.

Disputes are supposed to be resolved through the parliament

and ad hoc tribunals, but this does not often happen with any success. The
Mercosur parliament met for the first time in December 2006 in Brazil, when each

country hoped to have 18 representatives in parliament by 2010 (Reuters 2006).
The Parliament did not structurally develop as planned. Instead the parliament,
Parlasur, gives Brazil (with a population of 191 million, vs. just 3.5 million in

Uruguay and 6.8 million in Paraguay) 140 seats in the parliament, Brazil and
Argentina (population 40 million) both ceded seats in an effort to balance out the
distribution of power. The new agreement should be implemented by zo10, with 75
seats for Brazil and 43 for Argentina, while Uruguay and Paraguay will keep the 18
seats originally assigned to them under the first draft of the parliament
constitution (Mercosur Reform 2009).

Who and What is in Power

In the 1990s, President Cardoso of Brazil was primarily concerned with
bettering and enlarging trade with Europe and the U.S. However much the
country wanted the benefits of trade with these superpowers, the Cardoso
government was not quick to subscribe to all of the facets of liberalism; it was not
excited by the prospect of opening the economy nor did it wish to change its rules

of trade to fit those of its more powerful trading partners. With the government
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having these reservations, it failed to make clear, significant strides in either
direction. When the Lula government came on the scene, it was able to firm up
some of the more uncertain policies by promoting trade with other Latin American

countries rather than with Europe and the U.S. like his predecessor. Under Lula,
Brazil joined Mercosur and eliminated the special treatment the West had received
(Pedro da Motta Veiga, 2000).

Unfortunately, not long after Brazil’s move to Latin

American preference - before Mercosur could really become established,

Argentina began enacting protectionist policies.
Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates that standstills created by ineffective dispute
resolution can happen between large countries and small countries. In this case
two large countries are in conflict, but Argentina is still the smaller country - at
least in this case of Mercosur-reliant trade. Even a very small country could have
advantage over a large country in a certain area, making the actual size and
economic power of a large country mean little in that specific situation. Argentina
and Brazil are both large countries, but in this situation Argentina has more to
lose. It is afraid of possible Mercosur (or regional) domination by Brazil and it
relies more on Mercosur trade than Brazil does. As this case shows, negotiation

between large countries is difficult; neither one of the large countries has much
incentive to follow the rules because they have other possibilities that they
consider more effective.
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Mercosur is just as important in this case as in the last two because as it is a
step towards a rules-based system it has prevented the type of response expected
in an anarchic system.

Left without this incentive, Brazil and Argentina probably

would have gone ahead with complete economic sanctions or something worse.
Although Brazil has stopped talks occasionally, it has not completely written off
Argentina. Even these vicious spats are preferable to the relationship between the
two in the 1970s and 80s when they were facing serious military tension (Simon
Romero, 1999). While existing between anarchy and complete respect for the law
is an ineffective way to resolve disputes, it does promote progress and prevents
rash actions. As the world becomes more interdependent and international
opinion becomes more important, the general situation for small states improves.
In this case, Brazil has less to lose if Mercosur were to disband, but it also has
much to gain if Mercosur survives and becomes more respected and trusted.
Officials have differing views on how to ensure a progressive future for
Mercosur; some are willing to devote extensive resources to ensure it has a future,

while others are not so certain that Mercosur should be helped to survive.
“Mercosur and the region should set lower and more clearly defined goals,” says
former Uruguayan Foreign Affairs minister and former president for 16 years of the
Inter-American Development Bank, Enrique Iglesias in August 2009. Iglesias also
promotes the development of cooperation and communication through other
methods other than Mercosur. To him, developing and saving Mercosur is not the
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most important issue, but rather developing the fluidity of the region as a whole
and developing Uruguay’s international role in it (The Mercosur Dream 2009).

It is hard to imagine a bright future for Mercosur when it does not function,
and it is difficult to make Mercosur function when talks between the leading
nations in specific cases of trade liberalization rarely make it past the conference
table. That the two leading economies in Mercosur are resolving issues in this
manner does not bode well for the health of Mercosur now or in the future. Ifthe
member states, especially the two largest, do not find ways to work around the
constant feud, Mercosur will not be able to survive long in an ever globalizing
world (Mario E. Carranza, 2009).

Conclusion

In this paper I have discussed the nature and sources of the powers and
abilities given to small states and how those powers can and cannot be used. The
cases presented show that small states do gain relative power by joining trade
unions, but that at times this power can be overridden by that of larger nations.
This is due to the fact that in the sphere of international law, written rules do not
carry as much weight as “real world” power, such as economic or military power.
International law has developed much in recent history, but the lack of an overall

enforcer will always keep the system from being as efficient as a state government.
Mercosur as a trade union is the most sophisticated and functional one the region
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has seen, but it still has many problems. Small states have to choose when to work
through the system and when to back down very carefully because, depending on
how much the larger country has invested in the situation, the larger country
could just as easily ignore the rules and work outside the system as it could respect

it. Through globalization and the increasing importance of public opinion, even
today’s average man can influence public perception on foreign policy and other
pertinent issues through current media outlets. Every country needs international
stature, and both the large countries and small countries can gain respect through
dealings with each other. In this way countries can show themselves trustworthy,
thus becoming more appealing to other potential investors.
Mercosur has been working toward becoming more like the EU, the most
successful group of this type. The EU has the advantage of being well established
and respected, whereas member states of Mercosur often ignore the rules they
themselves wrote. This could also be a force behind the trepidation felt by some
about the prospect of allowing more countries to join the group; the EU and the
Euro were more easily managed when fewer and more like-minded countries were
members.

Now, as the economies of some countries that were hastily added fail to

live up to the EU’s standards, the group and its currency face serious possibility of
failure.

By showing three different ways countries act within Mercosur we can see

the different possibilities allowable under a system that is neither anarchic nor
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fully governed. Paraguay and Uruguay both receive benefits from Mercosur
membership, but neither of them has much control over the group’s future
because they have little outlet for aiding in dispute resolution between Argentina

and Brazil, the two countries that give Mercosur its weight. These larger countries
would lose standing if they were to break up the union, but they have less to lose
than Uruguay and Paraguay because they have more outside options, including
that of being able to start or join a new group more easily.
In the first case, Argentina provided a somewhat convoluted response to
Uruguay’s construction of the pulp mill. Instead of working through Mercosur, it
worked through a non-binding but internationally recognized legal institution- the
ICJ (Agence- Argentina). This action showed that the Argentine government had
mixed feelings on the course of action; its citizens were in uproar, so the

government could not simply ignore the issue, but it would probably have lost in a
Mercosur court because the pulp mill was bringing so much outside investment to
the region (something from which Argentina would benefit as well). Now, both
sides are losing money from the bridge blockade, but the Uruguayans are
benefitting much more from the pulp mill than they are losing, so they will not
likely change their position from simply a continued blockade or even a definitive
decision from the ICJ since it is non-binding and Uruguay could be held liable for

losses to its foreign investors (Diaz).
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The second case showed that working through the system is a viable option
in some cases. The framework was written to work properly, it does not only
because the participants are unwilling to give up the necessary liberties to allow
the system to do its job. Paraguay (nor any of the countries) could have prevented

Venezuela from entering forever, nor would they want to; circumstances can
change rapidly, especially when there are so many economies and cultures
involved. Also, the main concern was that Hugo Chavez would make himself a

liability, not with Venezuela as a country.

Paraguay could never have used

persuasion to block Venezuela’s entry; it does not yet have enough “real world”
sway to carry out an operation like that. However, by following correct procedure,
even when others do not, quickly negates the voices of possible dissenters because
the rules have long been written and agreed upon. Also, it demonstrates that

Mercosur gives Paraguay extra weight when dealing with Mercosur-related issues.
Venezuela has many more resources to offer than Paraguay, and if Uruguay, Brazil,

and Argentina had had to choose either Venezuela or Paraguay outside the
protective bubble of Mercosur, they most likely would have chosen the one with
more to offer.

Lastly, the disputes between Argentina and Brazil show that even (and
especially) if countries are on more equal playing fields, negotiation can be
extremely challenging.

Larger democracies have even less of a group mentality

than smaller ones, because they so have many interests, obligations, and opinions
within their own borders that it is difficult to have the majority agree on anything
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domestically, much less domestically and internationally. These two nations
should be the leaders of the group both at home and abroad, but instead they
bring the group down and lower its value in the sight of potential trading partners

(like the EU) by continually arguing over relatively small issues.
Small states join trade groups for the special benefits they provide them,
including an increased influence within and outside of the group. Depending on
the level of development of the group, these powers can be real or simply
perceived as real. The small states have to test their power by going against a
larger country to test whether the powers will work, something that could (and
probably will in an underdeveloped system) fail. These trade groups do not make
all countries equal, even if their treaties are written that way because power will
always follow money.

Even if they are not on an even playing field, the powers

given to the small country are beneficial because they make the dynamic more
equitable on some level. Mercosur is like the EU in its basic structure;

unfortunately it is far from it in its level and means of functionality. Important
issues in the EU are fed through the established and respected court system.
Mercosur also has a court system, but it is rarely used (Treaty, Gabriella). Also,

since Mercosur began later and in a different region with a different history and
different values, there is no reason that it will or should follow in the EU’s

footsteps. Just like the countries of Latin America had to find their own
mechanisms of government because they were different than those countries of
Europe, they will have to create treaties and unions that fit within the landscape of
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Latin American politics and culture (de la Torre, 2000).

The powers given to small

states are only as good as the trade unions themselves; the union can promise

equality or anything else, but it only is beneficial if it actually works. Being a small
state in the EU right now means more in terms of benefits than being a small state
in Mercosur.

Because the world is becoming smaller and more interconnected every day,
trust and international stature mean more than ever. Ifa large country treats a
smaller country as an equal partner, it is more likely that other small countries will
be able to place their confidence in that large nation. The large nation then can
build a network with countries of all sizes built on partnership. The popularity of
this idea of partnership among all types of nations is a relatively recent
phenomenon that began to develop when the great empires of the world ceased to
have control over their colonies.

Today, even traditional enemies are tied to each

other through exchange of ideas, technology, and goods. The benefits of this
globalization can be seen in almost every facet of Western life, so it is only natural
that nations benefitting from it today would want to continue on a path of
cooperation by creating and maintaining this type of union.
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